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According to an Orange County, California, press release from the District Attorney, a husband and wife, both attorneys, were charged with conspiracy for planting drugs in the car of a volunteer elementary school teacher, Jane Doe.
Kent Wycliffe Easter, and Jill Bjorkholm Easter, both 38, were arrested on June 19, 2012, by the Irvine Police Department and charged with one felony count each of conspiracy to procure the false arrest and charging of Jane Doe, false imprisonment, and conspiracy to falsely report a crime. If convicted, then they face a maximum sentence of three years in state prison. Defendants were arrested on $20,000 bail and are expected to be arraigned July 17th, at the Central Justice Center in Santa Ana. Kent Easter has been an active member of the State Bar of California since 1998. Jill Easter was admitted to the Bar in 1998, but her license is expired.
Mr. and Mrs. Easter’s son was a student at the school where Jane Doe volunteered, and defendants are accused of becoming angry with her because they believed she was improperly supervising their son. Defendants allegedly conspired to have her arrested in retaliation by placing a bag of Vicodin, Percocet, marijuana, and a used marijuana pipe behind the driver’s seat of her unlocked vehicle, and in plain sight for a police officer to see. Mr. Easter is accused of placing a phone call to police, giving a false name and phone number, and telling the dispatcher he was a concerned parent who witnessed an erratic driver parking at the elementary school. He is also accused of claiming to have witnessed Jane Doe, whom he identified by name, hide a bag of drugs behind her driver’s seat in her car. Perhaps DNA from the pipe will result in additional charges. He placed this call from a hotel phone allegedly caught on hotel surveillance. Should an attorney who behaves in this morally reprehensible way have their bar license taken away? Innocent until proven guilty…Stay tuned.
June 21st, 2012
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I am pleased to share with you below the recent publication for Constituting America. Amendment XXVI:
The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age.
Throughout our nation’s history the right to vote has remained a cornerstone of cherished civil liberties and democratic processes. This right, however, was granted to select members of the populace until a century and a half ago. The end of the Civil War brought about 3 “Reconstruction Amendments” aimed to bring constitutionally granted “blessings of liberty” to the black male populace – the 3rd of these, the 15th Amendment, ratified in 1870, granted voting rights regardless of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Half a century later, women were also granted the right to vote, after various organizations staged a protracted series of processions and protests. Several countries, such as Sweden, Finland (then known as the Grand Duchy (Dutch-ee)), Britain and Australia, had already forged ground in this area at the end of the 19th century. The resulting 19th Amendment was ratified in 1920, which prohibited state and federal sex-based voting restrictions. Additional suffrage privileges were granted with ratification of the 24th Amendment in 1964 – which guaranteed that voting rights of citizens “shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”
Age was the next obstacle to overcome.
The Constitution allowed states to dictate voting qualifications, subject to restrictions incorporated into Amendments. One of these Amendments, the 14th, mandated an age 21 minimum for male suffrage, with the caveat of withholding any state’s representation in Congress should this right be denied. With the onset of World War II, many young men and women under age 21 entered military service, sparking discussions about reducing the voting age to 18. It seemed ironic that one could be called up for military service at 18 and denied the right to vote for the country one was entrusted to defend. So, in 1942, four Congressmen introduced resolutions to reduce the age to 18. Over 150 proposals were initiated, some setting the age to 19. In the early 1950s, Senate debated one of “18” resolutions, but it failed by a vote of 34 to 24. By the late 1960s, the Vietnam War was rapidly escalating and thousands of young Americans enlisted, or, were drafted for active duty overseas. As of 1968, 25% of the troops were under age 21 and made up an even higher percentage of casualties. ‘Old enough to fight, old enough to vote’ became a mantra for the burgeoning Baby Boom generation.
The resolutions for lowering the voting age began to gain momentum once again. Congress held hearings on the subject between 1968 and 1970. These hearings touched on the link between military service and voting, but primarily focused on the increased educational levels of modern youth. Their discussions also focused on the ever-increasing responsibilities of the 18-21 year old demographic: attending college, driving automobiles, drinking alcohol (in subsequent years, states raised this age to 21), holding jobs, starting families, being tried as adults in court. Concurrently, in a narrow 5-4 vote, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Oregon v. Mitchell (1970) that 18 year olds could vote in federal elections, but not in those held at the state, or, local levels.
States now were tasked with evaluating their suffrage-age laws, and sixteen states did just that in 1970. Six states lowered the age and ten remained unswayed. Other states began to weigh administrative and cost advantages in matching the new federal framework. Congress then added a provision to the Voting Rights Act in 1970 setting the minimum voting age to 18 for both national and state elections, arguing it had broad power to protect voting rights under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. With that, Congress accelerated its commitment to incorporate the youth suffrage movement within the framework of the Constitution. Congress passed the 26th Amendment March 23, 1971. In the fastest ratification process on record (107 days), three fourths of the states ratified this landmark proposal July 1, 1971.
Note: Amendment 14, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 1 of the 26th amendment.
Click below for full website.
Monday, June 11, 2012 – Essay #81 – Amendment XXVI, Section 1 – Guest Essayist: Janice Brenman, Attorney
June 11th, 2012
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The Stern v. Marshall case brings to the fore a long standing struggle between state and federal law with regard to bankruptcy matters. The case began in a Texas probate court. Howard Marshall provided for his wife, Vickie Lynn Marshall (a.k.a, Anna Nicole Smith) outside his will, but Anna Nicole brought an action against Pierce Marshall, Howard Marshall’s son, alleging fraudulent interference with the intervivos trust. After her husband’s death, Ms. Marshall filed for bankruptcy, including a claim for tortious interference with a testamentary gift against her late husband’s son. The Bankruptcy Court ruled in her favor, awarding $425 million dollars. Pierce Marshall alleged that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim, because it was not a “core proceeding.” The Bankruptcy Court determined it had the power to enter judgment on the counterclaim under § 157(b)(1).
The District Court found it was unconstitutional under Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50, 79 n.31 (1982), for the Bankruptcy Court to enter any final judgment on the claim. (Marathon held that a bankruptcy court could not finally decided a state law claim against an entity that was not otherwise part of the bankruptcy proceeding.) The Court of Appeals in Stern reversed the District Court (on a different ground) but found that a counterclaim under § 157(b)(2)(C) is properly a “core proceeding arising in a case under the [Bankruptcy Code] only if the counterclaim is so closely related to [a creditor’s] proof of claim that the resolution of the counterclaim is necessary to resolve the allowance or disallowance of the claim itself.”
The United States Supreme Court then, likewise, determined the Bankruptcy court overstepped its jurisdictional power. Justice Roberts, writing for a 5-4 majority (J. Scalia concurring), held that though the Bankruptcy Court had statutory authority to enter judgment on the counterclaim under § 157(b)(2)(C), it lacked constitutional authority to do so. Relying on Marathon, Justice Roberts observed that since Bankruptcy Courts are not Article III courts, they are not vested with authority to decide state law tort (or contract) claims. Since the counterclaim at issue in the Stern case was “not a necessary part of the claims process,” as it involved “legal and factual questions that would not “necessarily” be resolved in connection with the adjudication of Pierce’s claim,” it could not be constitutionally adjudicated with finality by a bankruptcy court. The court discussed public rights (those rights so infused with a federal governmental action) versus private rights, and deemed the compulsory counterclaim at issue to be a matter of private rights. The Court was adamant about how this “narrow” holding would not “meaningfully change” the courts’ division of labor. “We are not convinced that the practical consequences of such limitations on authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments are … significant.”
Though the Stern holding addresses a rather narrow issue – the question of whether a bankruptcy court has the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on an otherwise non-core tort cause of action asserted as a compulsory counterclaim in a bankruptcy case – the case raises significant new matters for consideration by any business enterprise, or, individual that may end up engaged in litigation with a debtor entity – that is to say – all of us. Ultimately, Stern will serve to complicate the decision making tree for individual creditors contemplating the filing of a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case, as well as for parties who may find themselves enmeshed in litigation with a debtor.
Attorneys continue to represent Anna Nicole Smith’s estate and argued in federal California court Wednesday that Marshall Petroleum Inc., should be sanctioned tens of millions of dollars because the son of J. Howard Marshall II, Smith’s late husband, committed probate fraud nearly a decade ago, and swindled Smith out of a share of Marshall’s multimillion-dollar estate. (See below, Probate Battle Illustrates Value of Constitution’s Full Faith & Credit Clause) “If your honor doesn’t craft a sanctions motion, you’re probably going to have the largest swindle … take place right under this court’s nose, and it’s grotesque that that can occur,” Smith’s attorney Philip Boesch Jr., begged U.S. District Judge David O. Carter, “craft an order … you’re the court of last resort.”
April 8th, 2012
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Anna Nicole’s former psychiatrist Khristine Eroshevich and the California Medical Board reached a settlement. Eroshevich admitted to her conviction of a crime in the Anna Nicole case and confessed to making false statements in a psychiatric report, unrelated to that case. As a result, the Board is suspending Eroshevich’s medical license for 90 days and putting her on a 5 year probation. As you may recall, in October 2010, a jury convicted Eroshevich of a felony, which was reduced to a one year probation misdemeanor in 2011. Eroshevich will also have to undergo a psychiatric evaluation herself and take an ethics course.
April 6th, 2012
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Twenty-three year old serial killer, al-Queda Jihadist, Mohammed Merah, was gunned down by French police in a raid yesterday at his apartment in Toulouse, France after he murdered seven innocent men and children in both Toulouse and Montauban. Merah died from one bullet to the head fired by a police sniper. President Nicolas Sarkozy spared no resource in assuring the apprehension of Merah, and congratulated all of the security forces in their swift success.
The night before his death, Merah stated he killed the 3 Jewish school children, teacher, and 3 French soldiers for retaliation against the French Army and its involvement in Afghanistan; he bragged about being trained by al-Queda on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. His only regret was failing to kill more people.
These atrocities are yet another sobering, omnipresent reminder of the 9/11 attacks. Though passage of time may temper events, we must be mindful of ongoing fanatical terrorist attacks that exist on a global scale. France declared a moment of silence in memory of the murdered victims at every school campus. IMO, this memoriam should likewise be observed in the U.S.A.
March 23rd, 2012
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